Practical Node Policing in 802.11 WLANs by Feghhi, Hessan et al.
978-1-4673-5828-6/13/$31.00 c©2013 IEEE
Practical Node Policing in 802.11 WLANs
Hessan Feghhi, Paul Patras and David Malone
Hamilton Institute, National University of Ireland Maynooth
Maynooth, Co. Kildare, Ireland
E-mail: {hessan.feghhi,paul.patras,david.malone}@nuim.ie
Abstract—As open-source WiFi device drivers are increas-
ingly available, wireless equipment can be configured to disobey
the 802.11 specification, with the goal of achieving performance
gains, to the detriment of fair users. We demonstrate a practical
implementation of a node policing scheme that combats such
selfish behaviour, using commercial off-the-shelf hardware and
a modified firmware. With a small testbed, we show that access
points running our scheme can detect misbehaving stations,
inflict punishment upon them and effectively restore fairness
in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Channel access in current IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs
(WLANs) is usually controlled by the Distributed Coordina-
tion Function (DCF) [1]. Specifically, stations run indepen-
dent DCF instances, which assign transmission opportunities
in a decentralised fashion. Thus, each node is responsible for
its own behaviour and there is little incentive to play by the
standard rules if changes can be made to DCF. In fact, open-
source device drivers (e.g. MadWifi,1 compat-wireless,2 etc.)
provide flexible access to the Medium Access Control
(MAC) layer primitives, which enable users with minimal
programming skills to reconfigure their interfaces and boost
their performance, while starving compliant contenders.
To understand the impact of such attacks, consider a very
simple case of a real network with a regular access point
(AP) serving two clients, both sending backlogged UDP
traffic with payload size of 1000 Bytes, at 11 Mb/s PHY
rate. One of them employs compliant channel access, and
the other competes with a Contention Window minimum
parameter half the size of the standard’s default value (i.e.
CWmin = CW
default
min /2). Note that with e.g. Atheros
chipset based wireless cards and Linux operating system,
this is achievable by simply invoking an iwpriv system
command. As depicted in Fig. 1 (with light bars), in this
scenario the cheating node attains a throughput figure more
than twice that of the fair station, while the performance of
the other is clearly affected. We note that more sophisticated
attacks that manipulate the arbitration inter-frame spacing
(AIFS) or the transmission opportunity limit (TXOP) pa-
rameters would have even more significant impact on the
compliant users.
1http://www.madwifi-project.org
2http://wireless.kernel.org/en/users/Drivers
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Figure 1. Comparison of throughput performance with one attacker.
To address this problem, we have implemented a scheme
to police an 802.11 WLAN, whereby the AP measures
each station’s performance and then controls a probability
Pack that a node will not be sent an acknowledgement
(ACK) after a successful transmission, thus forcing it to
backoff and double its contention window, thereby reducing
its transmission probability. Considering the earlier example
scenario, this approach can successfully restore through-
put fairness between compliant and misbehaving nodes, as
shown in Fig. 1 (with dark bars).3 Our technique builds
upon earlier work [2], where analysis and simulation foresee
an appropriate controller can effectively tackle MAC mis-
behaviour. However, implementing ACK suppression with
real devices is a challenging task, since automatic repeat-
request (ARQ) is a basic operation handled at a low level of
the network stack. We tackle this challenge by exploiting
the OpenFWWF firmware,4 which offers high flexibility,
including access to functionality such as ACK generation,
and develop a practical policing implementation that we
deploy with commodity hardware.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our prototype, we
showcase a real scenario where a misbehaving user, engaged
in a file transfer operation, manipulates their MAC config-
uration to reduce transfer duration, while jeopardizing the
3We disable rate adaptation, but generally assume nodes run state-of-the-
art rate control algorithms, e.g. Minstrel, which only act upon failures due
to channel errors.
4http://www.ing.unibs.it/
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Figure 2. Policing implementation.
performance of a competing video flow. Using a Linux-based
AP equipped with a commercial off-the-shelf Broadcom
WiFi card, we show that our implementation detects the
cheater, rapidly counteracts the observed behaviour and
restores the quality of the video stream.
II. POLICING ALGORITHM
The operation of the policing algorithm relies on the
fundamental nature of ACK reception at the client side. In
our scheme, when the AP decides not to generate an ACK,
it also drops the received frame, just as if it was corrupt.
Consequently, even misbehaving stations must resend the
packet to ensure successful delivery. Further, the subsequent
retries occur less frequent, given the CW doubling. Other-
wise, aggressive nodes employing fixed CW settings will
be eventually disassociated. This technique only requires
changes at the AP and does not change the 802.11 rules.
Further, it adds no additional signalling between AP and
well-behaved nodes for detecting cheaters, which makes it
easy to deploy.
Pack controller operation: The algorithm is executed
iteratively and involves controlling, at each step, the proba-
bility Pack,i, with which the frames of a station i will not
be acknowledged during the next cycle [2]:
P k+1ack,i =
[
P kack,i + α
(
Ski
Skf
− (1− γP kack,i)
)]
0,1
,
where [x]a,b = max(a,min(b, x)), Ski is the throughput of
client i, Skf is the maximum rate a well-behaved node can
attain, α > 0 is a parameter controlling adaptation rate and
γ > 0 introduces a penalty for misbehaviour.
Fair throughput estimation: Unlike previous works that
focus on identifying the mechanisms of cheating and coun-
teract (if at all) depending on their nature (e.g. [3], [4]), with
our approach the AP estimates the maximum throughput of
a fair station Sf given the current conditions and remains
agnostic to the form of misbehaviour. Specifically, we ob-
serve the channel states (idle/busy) at the AP to estimate the
collision probability p seen by a “virtual” fair MAC instance
that follows the 802.11 protocol but does not actually inject
any traffic, which we compute as follows:
p =
#busy slots
#busy slots+#idle slots .
Subsequently, we use this do derive the expected “fair”
throughput performance Sf using a model [5].
Implementation: We implemented our mechanisms on
x86-based computers, equipped with Broadcom B4318
adapters, running Debian Linux (kernel 2.6.32) and the
mac80211 framework with modified b43 driver and Open-
FWWF firmware. Fig. 2 depicts the key building blocks.
The ACK dropping resides in the firmware, as this is a
time sensitive task. A table with Pack values corresponding
to each associated station is stored in the shared memory.
Upon a frame reception, a look-up routine fetches the
appropriate Pack and then skips ACK generation with the
appropriate probability. The virtual MAC is also included in
the firmware and runs whenever the adapter processing unit
is in idle state. Note that this happens not only when the
channel is idle, but also when transmissions/receptions are
ongoing, thus we obtain estimates with good accuracy.
ACK drop probabilities must be updated periodically,
to account for the network dynamics. These updates are
performed by the driver, which has access to the inputs
required and typically runs on a higher performance CPU
than the firmware. The Pack updates are performed by
measuring per-station throughput and comparing with the
estimated fair value.
III. DEMO SCENARIO
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our implementation,
we consider the scenario in Fig. 3, where station 1 is
Figure 3. Demo scenario.
Figure 4. Demo visualisation tools: the received video stream is displayed
at the top of the GUI; the plots on the bottom show in real time the measured
throughput (left) and the applied ACK dropping probabilities (right).
streaming a 2 Mb/s MPEG-2 encoded video of “Ice Age 3:
Dawn of the dinosaurs” teaser, with an approximate duration
of 2 minutes. Simultaneously, station 2 is uploading a large
data file to the wired network. Nodes are configured with
the HR/DSSS (802.11b) PHY layer parameters (11 Mb/s
data rate). The policing algorithm runs at the AP and a set
of visualisation tools are deployed on the wired client, both
to illustrate in real-time the operation of the policing scheme
(i.e. the time evolution of Pack and the measured per-station
throughput Si), and to permit the playback and subjective
evaluation of the quality of the video (see Fig. 4).
Normal operation: First, we consider that both stations
follow the IEEE 802.11 standard rules and show that under
such circumstances the video is streamed with no perfor-
mance degradation, while the remaining channel capacity is
used to accommodate the transfer of the data file. We use
this setup as a benchmark for comparing the throughput and
video performance when the AP operates with and without
the policing scheme, and the node sending data is cheating,
as we explain next.
Node misbehaviour, without policing: To show the
impact of MAC misbehaviour, we configure the CWmin
parameter of station 2 to half of the value recommended
by the standard and repeat the previous experiment. This
setting increases the aggressiveness of station 2, which will
be backlogged with packets. Consequently, it will consume
most of the available capacity, thereby leaving station 1
unable to satisfy the bandwidth demands of the video flow.
Using our graphical interface, we show that the cheater
achieves a throughput value nearly twice that of the fair
node, while the degradation of the video quality can be easily
observed from the frequently garbled playback.
Node misbehaviour, with policing: Finally, we activate
the node policing mechanism at the AP and repeat the
experiment with one cheating node sending data and a fair
station streaming video. We show that the policing algorithm
quickly detects the attack and increases the ACK dropping
probability corresponding to the misbehaving node. As a
result, station 2 is forced to backoff periodically, which
effectively reduces its transmission attempt rate and conse-
quently limits the attained performance. This is visible in the
time evolution of the throughput displayed in the GUI, which
is immediately throttled down to the fair value, leaving more
transmission opportunities for the fair contender. Conversely,
as station 1 is following the standard specifications, its
corresponding Pack probability remains effectively at zero,
and the quality of the transmitted video is preserved.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the increased number of wireless devices that
permit modifying the 802.11 MAC parameters, users have
little incentive to conform to the standard specification.
With this demo, we showcase a practical solution that can
be implemented with commodity hardware and effectively
polices 802.11 misbehavoiur, without requiring any coop-
eration between the AP and clients, therefore being fully
standard compliant.
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